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Abstract
Has the financial crisis influenced taxes on the rich? In this article, I argue that
crisis countries have raised income tax progressivity because of fiscal fairness con-
siderations. I test this claim by analysing a new dataset on top marginal personal
income tax (PIT) rates for 122 countries from 2006–2014, applying matching meth-
ods and a difference-in-differences design. The results show that countries with a
financial crisis have increased top PIT rates by 4 percentage points. Furthermore,
rising public debt only leads to higher top PIT rates when it is crisis-induced.
These findings demonstrate that notions of fiscal fairness can still shape progres-
sive taxation in the 21st century.
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1 Introduction
Progressive taxation is in vogue again. In the aftermath of the global financial cri-
sis of 2008, claims to ‘tax the rich’ have gained publicity (Samuelson, 2011). Most
prominently, US politicians like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Elizabeth Warren, and
Bernie Sanders have recently proposed tax hikes on the wealthiest members of so-
ciety (Casselman & Tankersley, 2019). In addition, the seminal work of scholars like
Piketty (2014) and Atkinson (2015) contributed to the post-crisis debate on income
and wealth concentration at the top. But – after three decades of downward trends in
top PIT rates (Genschel & Schwarz, 2011; Kemmerling, 2010; Swank, 2016) – has the
crisis really been a game-changer?
In this article, I argue that the financial crisis has indeed caused a turnaround
in the politics of progressive taxation. Based on recent work that stresses the role of
fairness considerations in tax policy-making (Scheve & Stasavage, 2016), I claim that
the crisis and states’ reactions to it have violated citizens’ fiscal fairness principles as
financial risk-takers were bailed out with public money. Critics of such state actions
have characterised them as ‘socialism for the rich’ that privatises profits and socialises
losses (Stiglitz, 2015). I expect that, as a consequence, governments in crisis countries
have increased taxes on top incomes.
I use a novel dataset on top marginal PIT rates for 122 countries from 2006–
2014 to test my argument empirically. First, I combine matching methods with a
difference-in-differences design to identify the causal impact of the financial crisis on
top PIT rates. Afterwards, I analyse panel data to compare the effects of fiscal prob-
lem pressure on top PIT rates between crisis and non-crisis countries. My results
show that countries which have been hit by the financial crisis have increased their
top PIT rates by 4 percentage points on average. Thus, the general downward trend
in top income tax rates (Ganghof, 2006b; Kiser & Karceski, 2017) has been reversed
in countries with a financial crisis. Importantly, we cannot find these differences be-
tween crisis and non-crisis countries for regressive consumption taxes. Furthermore,
panel models reveal that rising public debt does not lead to higher top PIT rates per se.
Public debt only leads to increasing top PIT rates if is induced by the financial crisis.
These results support my argument that rising tax rates on the rich are not solely the
result of higher revenue needs in crisis countries. Instead, the procedural dimension
matters: if countries face fiscal troubles due to the financial crisis, governments in-
crease taxes on the rich to restore fiscal fairness.
The contribution of my article is threefold. First, the article speaks to a growing
body of literature that finds new trends in the politics of taxation since the financial
crisis (Emmenegger, 2015; Hakelberg, 2016; Hakelberg & Rixen, 2018). Whilst most of
the literature focusses on the causes and consequences of novel forms of international
tax regulation (like the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI)), my article adds
the domestic dimension to these studies.
Second, my findings show that the financial crisis has had a causal impact on
top income tax rates. Financial crises, just like mass wars (Scheve & Stasavage, 2010),
can increase taxes on the rich. In the absence of mass warfare, financial crises have
the potential to trigger considerations of unequal fiscal treatment. As a consequence,
compensatory demands for taxing the rich can still lead to policy change. This is
particularly important in the light of recent studies which deal with unequal repre-
sentation in favour of the rich (Bartels, 2008; Page, Bartels, & Seawright, 2013) and the
structural power of business on the formation of tax policy preferences (Emmenegger
& Marx, 2018). My analysis does not disprove the idea that affluent citizens have a
higher influence on tax policy-making. However, the findings show that general com-
pensatory demands still matter for taxing the rich.
Third, this article calls for a more nuanced discussion of fiscal policy responses
to the financial crisis. In the comparative political economy literature, much work
has dealt with austerity measures in the wake of the Great Recession (Schäfer &
Streeck, 2013). Austerity has been identified as a widespread policy response to the
crisis (Armingeon, Guthmann, & Weisstanner, 2016; Steinebach, Knill, & Jordana,
2017). Against this backdrop, my analysis demonstrates that fairness considerations
are crucial for fiscal consolidation programmes. Perceived violations of fiscal fairness
principles can affect who has to pay for the crisis. Hence, although this study focuses
on taxation, it opens up discussions about how fairness considerations might interact
with the spending side of public households.
The article is structured as follows. I start by reviewing the literature on taxing
the rich with a specific focus on studies that refer to the impact of individual fair-
ness beliefs on tax policies. Afterwards, I develop my argument on fairness claims
for progressive taxation in the wake of the financial crisis and present my working
hypotheses. In the empirical part, I describe the dataset and explain my identification
strategy. After presenting and discussing my results, the final section concludes.
2 Taxing the Rich
Taxation of the richest members of society shows a huge variation across the world.
Figure 1 maps top marginal PIT rates worldwide for the year 2014. Whereas some
countries do not tax income at all (e.g., Brunei, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates), other countries tax top incomes with marginal rates of more than 45 %
(e.g., Canada, France, and Japan). In this section, I will give a short overview on
three major literature strands that offer explanations for this variation: theories on
globalisation, domestic institutions, and fairness considerations.
Studies about the impact of globalisation on tax progressivity have been partic-
ularly prominent in the political economy literature. The general theoretical expecta-
tion is that internationalisation and globalisation cause decreasing tax progressivity
(Ganghof, 2006b; Kiser & Karceski, 2017). We can differentiate between two differ-
ent versions of the globalisation theory. First, globalisation might lead to a spread
of neoliberal ideas which evaluate progressive taxation as economically inefficient
(Steinmo, 2003; Swank & Steinmo, 2002). In their most simple form, these ideas see
highly progressive tax systems as a drag on economic growth. Whereas broad-based,
single rate taxes like consumption taxes cause only little deadweight loss, a steeply
progressive (income) tax system can lead to changes in market behaviour which might
Figure 1: Top Marginal PIT Rate Worldwide in 2014
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create inefficient economic outcomes (Hall & Jorgenson, 1967). This problem can in-
crease with growing budget size (Lindert, 2004). Second, economic globalisation can
lead to competition between nation states over tax efficiency (Genschel & Schwarz,
2011). Especially in the last four decades, increasing capital mobility due to fewer
transnational (financial) restrictions, the expansion of double tax avoidance, and tech-
nological advance have led to tax competition between countries. As a consequence,
tax rates on capital have been lowered (Franzese & Hays, 2008; Ganghof, 2006b; Rixen,
2011). Small states have particularly strong incentives to decrease top tax rates for cap-
ital income since initial revenue losses can be compensated by subsequent tax base
expansions (Haufler & Wooton, 1999; Kanbur & Keen, 1993; Wilson, 1991). Because
of the so-called ‘backstop function’ of the corporate income tax, competition over low
corporate income tax rates also affects the progressivity of the PIT (Ganghof & Gen-
schel, 2008).
Whilst globalisation theories look at the impact of worldwide interdependen-
cies, institutional approaches focus on how domestic rules, structures, and norms
influence taxation. Domestic institutions can influence tax policy-making in manifold
ways (Levi, 1988). Based on the assumption that individuals’ tastes for tax policies
are solely driven by economic self-interest, the median voter theorem (MVT) expects
democratisation to lead to an increase in progressive taxation (Meltzer & Richard,
1981). However, the straightforward MVT expectation that democratic institutions
lead to a higher taxation of the rich is subject to academic debate (Scheve & Stasavage,
2012). Aidt and Jensen (2009) find that democracies are laggards when it comes to the
introduction of personal income taxes. Mares and Queralt (2015) argue that the role of
sectoral elites and the linkage between voting rights and taxation can account for this
empirical pattern. In addition, the interplay between landholding inequality, taxation
of elites, and democratisation has gained huge scholarly interest recently (Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2000; Ansell & Samuels, 2014; Boix, 2003). Work on the resource curse
that deals with the negative impact of natural resource wealth on (income) taxation
and democratisation is closely related to the taxation and democratisation literature
(Ross, 2001). Since countries that are rich in natural resources do not need to tax their
citizens, claims of ‘no taxation without representation’ do not emerge and democrati-
sation is unlikely. Amongst democracies, different institutional settings matter as well.
For example, Iversen and Soskice (2006) argue that proportional electoral systems
cause more redistributive tax and transfer systems than majoritarian systems. Also,
the institutional perspective and theories of globalisation are not mutually exclusive.
For instance, many domestic veto-points dampen the negative impact of globalisation
on tax progressivity (Basinger & Hallerberg, 2004; Ganghof, 2006b). Furthermore, au-
tocracies are less participative in tax competition than democracies (Genschel, Lierse,
& Seelkopf, 2016).
In contrast to the global and institutional approaches, fairness-based explana-
tions offer a slightly different perspective on the politics of taxing the rich. In this
framework, personal perceptions of socio-economic outcomes as fair are considered
to be important for redistribution (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Ballard-Rosa, Martin, &
Scheve, 2017; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). If inequality is perceived as unfair, demand for
correcting these inequalities will be higher (Lü & Scheve, 2016; Tyran & Sausgruber,
2006). This phenomenon is called self-centered inequity aversion.1
Most studies have analysed the impact of fairness on progressive taxation (and
on redistribution in general) either via formal modelling (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) or by
looking at preferences on the micro level (Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez, & Rider, 2007;
Durante, Putterman, & van der Weele, 2014; Fong, 2001). The lack of comparative
macro-studies comes as no surprise. In particular, disentangling effects of economic
self-interest and effects of self-centered inequity aversion on progressive taxation can
be tricky. Most importantly, explaining differences in progressive taxation between
countries by arguing that they differ in fairness perceptions needs to address why
countries vary in their perception of fairness in the first place. In their historical
study on the impact of mass warfare on progressive taxation, Scheve and Stasavage
(2016) try to overcome these problems by taking the procedural dimension into con-
sideration: when procedures are perceived as fair, their outcomes are less likely to
be challenged by redistributive taxation. More specifically, the two authors look at
whether state’s actions violate the principle of treating citizens as equal. If this is the
case, compensatory arguments that aim at restoring the principle of equal treatment
will gain power. In other words, fairness-based self-centered inequity aversion will
increase. Regarding taxes on the rich, this has been the case during times of mass war-
fare. As wealthy citizens have a smaller likelihood of fighting in a war and/or gain
higher financial profits from war efforts, they enjoy a preferential treatment by the
state. Hence, the highly progressive post-war tax systems in the OECD were shaped
by the demand to restore fiscal fairness (Scheve & Stasavage, 2010, 2012). Moreover,
fairness arguments to tax the rich have lost power in the last four decades due to
the absence of mass warfare. However, macro level studies that look at the impact of
fairness arguments in the absence of mass warfare are completely missing. As I argue
in the following section, particularly the shock of the 2008 financial crisis and states’
reactions to it have led to a revival of fairness considerations to tax the rich.
3 Fiscal Fairness and Taxation after the Financial Crisis
From the mid 1970s until the financial crisis, taxation of the rich declined drastically.
For instance, top PIT rates in the OECD decreased from 70 % in 1975 to 50 % in 2005
(Ganghof, 2006b, p. 1). It is noteworthy that this decline happened during a time
period where OECD countries faced substantially lower growth rates, growing unem-
ployment, and increasing public debt (OECD, 2018b; Pierson, 1998). A similar trend
of decreasing tax rates can be observed when the country sample is expanded beyond
the OECD (Peter, Buttrick, & Duncan, 2010). However, since the financial meltdown of
2008, this trend has come to a standstill. In fact, top PIT rates even increased slightly
on average in the OECD from 2008 to 2016 (OECD, 2017). So, has the financial crisis
had a causal effect on top PIT rates? And, if yes, how exactly?
I argue that the sudden halt to the downward movement in taxing top incomes
can be explained by notions of fiscal fairness during and after the financial crisis. Fair-
ness considerations for restoring equal fiscal treatment have been articulated promi-
nently during the crisis. Take Ireland, for instance, which was hit extremely hard by
the financial crisis of 2008. The budget of 2009 increased the tax progressivity of the
income tax system by raising top tax rates via an additional income levy for top in-
comes while increasing the standard rate tax band. In his speech on the 2009 budget,
then Minister of Finance Brian Lenihan (Fianna Fáil) – declared:
"The Government is concerned that some of the more expensive tax reliefs,
especially for the better off, should be scaled back and the resources used,
as appropriate, to protect those taxpayers who are most vulnerable in these
times. It is fair and reasonable that those who profited most from the
recent good economic times should shoulder a commensurate burden as
conditions worsen." (Lenihan, 2008)
A supplementary budget in April 2009 increased the progressivity of the Irish
income tax system even further by doubling income levy rates. Lenihan repeatedly
referred to the fairness dimension of these tax increases: "The Government has taken
care to ensure they are fair, equitable and highly progressive" (Lenihan, 2009). The
overall increases in top personal income tax rates during the crisis from 41% to 48%,
although implemented by a conservative government, even match the Irish Congress
of Trade Unions proposal who demanded "a fair contribution from the wealthy"
(ICTU, 2009).
But how has the financial crisis influenced fairness considerations for higher
taxes on the rich? Based on the work of Scheve and Stasavage (2016), I argue that
compensatory arguments demanding a correction of unequal treatment by the state
have pushed for higher taxes on the rich. This perception of unequal treatment came
in two forms: first, indirectly because of regulatory passivity prior to the crisis and,
second, directly through state actions during the financial crisis.
Indirect unequal treatment stems from unregulated international financial mar-
kets in the run up to the crisis. More specifically, weak regulatory interventions fos-
tered two developments that have affected compensatory claims for tax progressivity.
First, richer citizens were the beneficiaries of these unregulated markets prior to the
crisis. Increasing tax progressivity therefore aims at making especially those who
previously profited the most from deregulated financial systems pay for the crisis.
Second, a lack of financial regulation enabled rich investors to take up systemic risks
in their financial activities. These risky investments have been perceived as causes of
the crisis, which led to blame attribution to rich elites and particularly bankers (Bar-
tels & Bermeo, 2014). Taken together, regulatory passivity of states has caused the
perception of an unequal treatment of citizens indirectly because it allowed profitable
financial risk-taking that facilitated the financial crisis.
Direct unequal treatment during the crisis originates from large scale bailouts
of troubled financial enterprises. These public bailout programmes mark an unequal
treatment of citizens by the state: a richer subgroup of the population – people in-
volved in or profiting from risky financial activities – benefits from bailouts while
costs are externalised by pooling them amongst society as a whole. As described in
the previous section, it is the process leading to an outcome that matters for percep-
tions of fairness, not the final outcome itself. For bank bailouts during the crisis, this
means that higher public debt alone is not the main driver leading to a higher tax
burden on the rich. What matters is that increases in debt came in the form of exter-
nal effects induced by state actions. This procedural dimension fosters compensatory
demands for tax progressivity (Limberg, 2019). Admittedly, there are more efficient,
straightforward ways to compensate for bailouts than raising top PIT rates. For ex-
ample, in 2010 Italy introduced an additional levy of 10% on variable compensation
paid to managers in the financial sector (EY, 2015). Moreover, the G20 at their sum-
mit in Pittsburgh from 24-25 September 2009 requested the International Monetary
Fund to summarise possible options ‘how the financial sector could make a fair and
substantial contribution toward paying for any burdens associated with government
interventions to repair the banking system’ (IMF, 2010). However, putting a higher tax
burden on struggling financial institutions that are kept alive by public money seems
counter-intuitive in times of crisis. Excluding those banks which are under immediate
financial distress is not an option either, as this would not only fail to fulfil the original
purpose of compensation but would also punish those banks which have taken less
risky activities. Yet, the existence of other, more direct ways of fiscal compensation
means that using top PIT rates is a conservative empirical strategy.
It is important to mention that countries with a financial crisis might increase
top PIT increases just to generate desperately needed revenues. Two things have to
be considered here. First, if financial crises generally increase tax rates because of
revenue needs, the effect would be even stronger for taxes with a broad tax base like
consumption taxes (Kenny & Winer, 2006). Second, if top PIT rates are only increased
to react to revenue shortfalls, we would expect higher debt to raise rates regardless
of the procedural dimension. In other words, increasing levels of public debt would
lead to higher tax rates even in the absence of a financial crisis. To the contrary, a
fairness-based explanation will only expect more public debt to increase tax progres-
sivity if the procedure that led to rising debt is perceived as unfair. With regard to
my study, this means that higher debt will only lead to increasing top PIT rates in
countries that have experienced a prior financial crisis. The fact that PIT rates have
declined massively since the mid 1970s – thus, after the end of the post-war economic
boom and in times of ‘permanent austerity’ (Pierson, 1998) – supports the view that
higher debt does not lead to higher tax progressivity per se. I will come back to both
points in the empirical analysis.
Based on these theoretical considerations, I formulate my working hypotheses.
First, I have argued that fiscal fairness considerations in the wake of the crisis have
increased taxes on the rich and particularly top PIT rates.
H1: Countries with a financial crisis have increased top PIT rates to a higher extent than
countries without a financial crisis.
Second, if fairness arguments are pushing for increases in top PIT rates, we
would not expect to see a similar effect for a regressive tax such as the value-added
tax (VAT) or, respectively, the general sales tax (GST). Therefore, my second hypothe-
sis is as follows.
H2: Countries with a financial crisis have not increased standard GST/VAT rates to a
higher extent than countries without a financial crisis.
GSTs and even more so VATs are considered to be especially efficient and growth
friendly (Kato, 2003; Lindert, 2004; Messere, de Kam, & Heady, 2003; OECD, 2018a;
Wilensky, 2002). In particular, they can help to increase the overall tax take whilst
keeping capital taxation at modest levels (Ganghof, 2006a). Thus, increasing GST/-
VAT rates is a viable policy option for governments which worry about economic
growth in times of crisis. Hence, one could expect that countries with a financial cri-
sis have increased GST/VAT rates purely out of economic reasons. This makes H2 a
hard test for my argument.
Third, I have argued that fiscal fairness considerations were triggered by (non-
)state action before and during the crisis. Crisis-induced increases in public debt are
therefore the most visible consequence of this unequal treatment. In the absence of a
financial crisis, however, I do not expect higher public debt to have an effect on top
PIT rates.
H3: Higher public debt increases top PIT rates if it appears in the wake of the financial
crisis.
4 Data and Methods
In order to test my hypotheses empirically, I use a new, self-constructed dataset on top
marginal PIT rates in 122 countries from 2006–2014. Top PIT rates have been widely
used and accepted as a measurement of income tax progressivity (Ganghof, 2006b;
Peter et al., 2010; Swank, 2016; Volscho & Kelly, 2012). Scheve and Stasavage (2016)
look at full schedules of income tax rates to compare tax progressivity across coun-
tries and time. They find that changes in top PIT rates are a good indicator for overall
changes in tax progressivity. Furthermore, higher top marginal income tax rates are
an effective policy instrument to lower inequality. Huber, Huo, and Stephens (2017)
show that raising top PIT rates reduces extreme income concentration at the top.
I code the top marginal PIT rate for residents excluding social security contri-
butions. If income taxes are levied both on the national and on the local level, rates
are combined and the local top rate is taken. In case schedular income taxes are in
place, I code the overall top rate. Some countries (e.g. Mauritania) have scheduler
income taxes and a general income tax that applies if more than one kind of income
is generated. In these cases, the rates for general income tax are taken. Coding is
based on the Ernst & Young Worldwide Personal Tax and Immigration Guides from
2006-2015 (EY, 2015). Additionally, data has been checked and expanded using IMF
country reports, several Deloitte reports on ‘Key Economies in Africa’ (Deloitte, 2015),
and the ‘Taxing Work’ database from the OECD (2017). Standard GST/VAT rates are
taken from KPMG (2017) and additional information on whether a GST/VAT was in
place or not comes from the Tax Introduction Database (Genschel & Seelkopf, 2019).
The empirical analysis is twofold. I start off by testing H1 and H2. To do so,
I use a difference-in-differences design to look at the impact of the financial crisis
on the change in top PIT and standard VAT rates. The difference in tax rates is cal-
culated from 2007–2010 to capture short-term developments and from 2007–2014 for
medium-term change. Data on whether a specific country was hit by a financial crisis
in a respective year comes from Laeven and Valencia (2013). The authors measure
banking crisis with a dichotomous variable that takes the value one if at least two of
the following six criteria are met2: deposit freeze and bank holiday, extensive liquidity
support, significant guarantees on bank liabilities, significant bank restructuring costs,
significant asset purchases, and significant nationalizations. For a detailed description
of the exact thresholds for each criterion, see Laeven and Valencia (2013, p.230 f.). In
total, 25 countries in my sample have experienced a financial crisis (Table A1 in the
Online Appendix).3 Based on the potential outcome approach, I estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT),
τATT = E(τ|D = 1) = E[Y(1)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 1] (1)
where τATT denotes the treatment effect, D the treatment of facing a financial
crisis, Y(1) the mean change in tax rates for treated and Y(0) for untreated countries.
Hence, E[Y(1)|D = 1] is the expected mean change in tax rates for treated countries
that have received the treatment and E[Y(0)|D = 1] the counterfactual mean. How-
ever, the counterfactual mean is not directly observable because we do not know how
tax rates in crisis countries would have changed if they had not been hit by a financial
crisis. Therefore, I take the mean change in tax rates of untreated countries instead.
τATT = E(τ|D = 1) = E[Y(1)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 0] (2)
Yet, experiencing a financial crisis might not be random. If factors that lead
to selection into treatment also influence the potential outcome, results may be bi-
ased. In order to estimate τATT, we therefore have to make two identification as-
sumptions. The selection on observables assumption states that we can observe all
variables which might influence both the likelihood of being treated and the outcome
of interest. Furthermore, the overlap assumption demands that units – in my case
countries – with the same values for a set of covariates X have a positive probability
of being either in the control or in the treatment group. Based on these assumptions, I
apply a matching approach to deal with the possible selection bias. More specifically,
I use genetic matching minimising the mahalanobis distance based on X (Diamond &
Sekhon, 2012).
I match upon three covariates which may (1) increase the likelihood of facing a
financial crisis and (2) lead to rising top PIT rates. First, richer countries might have
a higher risk of facing a financial meltdown as they have bigger financial sectors and
a higher degree of monetisation. Moreover, richer states have a higher administrative
capacity to levy and collect income taxes (Dincecco, 2011). Hence, these countries
could also be more likely to increase top PIT rates. Therefore, I include a country’s
GDP per capita (logged values) (World Bank, 2018) in my matching procedure. Sec-
ond, countries with a higher amount of public debt might be more vulnerable to
financial crises. In addition, high levels of public debt may also lead governments to
increase tax rates in order to consolidate public households (Kenny & Winer, 2006). I
include public debt (% of GDP) into my matching models to account for this (World
Bank, 2017). Third, countries which are better integrated into global flows of goods
and services could be more likely to be hit by a financial crisis (Reinhart & Rogoff,
2009). At the same time, the degree of globalisation can also affect tax policy-making
in the wake of the crisis. On the one hand, globalisation has had a negative impact
on tax progressivity up to the financial crisis (Ganghof, 2006b; Genschel & Schwarz,
2011). On the other hand, countries which have lowered top rates to a higher ex-
tent prior to the crisis might have more room for increasing tax rates again. In other
words, a high degree of globalisation could even have a positive impact on top tax
rates in the wake of the crisis. To measure a country’s openness, I use the overall KOF
Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher, Gaston, & Martens, 2008). For all three
variables, I take the 2007 values to avoid post-treatment bias. Furthermore, I include
the matched-on variables in the regression models after creating the matched dataset
(Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 2007).
Although the matching approach controls for biases in treatment assignment,
it is based on the selection on observables assumption. In other words, matching is
not a silver bullet. There might still be other country characteristics that can affect
whether a country has faced a financial crisis or not. However, selection bias may
even reduce the observed crisis effect. Think, for instance, of countries with a gen-
erally more liberal approach to policy-making (Castles, 1993). Such countries could
not only be more likely to experience crises due to loose financial regulations, but
they might also be more reluctant to expand redistribution via progressive taxation.
A similar logic applies with respect to country size. Smaller countries often possess
big financial sectors and might therefore be more vulnerable to financial shocks. At
the same time, standard theories of tax competition expect small countries to lower
tax rates on mobile assets considerably (Bucovetsky, 1991). As a consequence, being a
small state can have a negative impact on the development of top PIT rates. In sum,
not including these characteristics in my matching models means that the estimated
crisis effect may even be biased downwards. Hence, only matching on characteristics
which might (1) increase the likelihood of a financial crisis and (2) raise top PIT rates
is a conservative test strategy.
Additionally to the matching approach, I also apply weighting methods (see Ta-
ble A2). I calculate propensity scores based on my set of covariates X. These reflect
"the conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector
of observed covariates" (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, p.41). Thus, the identification
assumptions are satisfied if we condition on the propensity scores (Austin, 2011; Hi-
rano, Imbens, & Ridder, 2003).
In order to test for the impact of changes in public debt on top PIT rates in the
wake of a financial crisis (H3), I look at yearly data for all 122 countries in my sample
from 2006–2014. Since I am mainly interested in tax policy changes, I apply a model
that looks at the first difference of the dependent variable. This allows me to rule
out unobserved country heterogeneity by looking at changes for my main variables
of interest whilst also estimating level effects (e.g., for democracy). Furthermore, I
include year fixed effects to control for common trends. The models are calculated
with country-cluster robust standard errors. Again, the central dependent variable
is the change of a country’s top PIT rate in a respective year and data for financial
crises is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2013). Fiscal problem pressure is measured
by changes in public debt (% of GDP) (World Bank, 2018). To rule out endogeneity,
changes in debt are lagged by one year. I let the indicator interact with the crisis
dummy (lagged by one year) to compare the impact of changing debt in the wake of
the financial crisis to normal times. To account for convergence dynamics in tax policy
making, I include the lagged level of the top PIT rate (Plümper & Schneider, 2009).
Furthermore, I include a battery of covariates to control for several institutional, eco-
nomic, and political characteristics of a country (Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 2013; Dreher,
2006; Dreher et al., 2008; World Bank, 2018). Since the choice of method for estimating
time-series cross-sectional models can produce strongly deviating results, I also run
several other model specifications (see Table A5 in the Online Appendix).
5 Results
Before we turn to the matching models, let us first look at the naive difference-in-
differences estimator without accounting for a possible selection bias (Equation 2). A
simple t-test reveals that countries with a financial crisis have increased top PIT rates
by 2.4 percentage points in the short (2007–2010) and by 3.7 percentage points in the
medium run (2007–2014) compared to non-crisis countries. Both results are statisti-
cally highly significant. In contrast, changes in VAT rates do not differ significantly
between crisis and non-crisis countries. Importantly, this estimator only looks at the
difference between countries with and without a financial crisis. Overall, GST/VAT
rates have increased by 0.8 percentage points. Thus, consumption tax rates have faced
a general upward trend regardless whether a country was hit by a financial crisis or
not. This finding is in line with research on overall trends in tax policy making during
the last decade (Lierse & Seelkopf, 2016). Top PIT rates, to the contrary, have been
increased in countries with a financial crisis and slightly decreased elsewhere. Figure
2 shows mean changes in top PIT rates from 2006 to the respective year. Until 2008,
rates in countries with and without a financial crisis show a slight downward trend.4
Since the crisis, however, rates have diverged.
Figure 2: Change in Top PIT Rate From 2006 for Countries With and Without a Finan-
cial Crisis
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Looking at the balance statistics reveals that countries that were hit by the crisis
were richer, had more public debt, and were globalised to a higher extent (Table
A3). As these factors may also influence tax policies, a selection bias might affect the
results. When simply controlling for these covariates without matching the data (Table
1, Models 1 & 2 as well as Models 5 & 6), the financial crisis still has a positive and
statistically significant effect on top PIT rates. The difference-in-differences estimator
shows a crisis effect of 2.6 percentage points in the short run and 4 percentage points
in the medium run. To the contrary, the financial crisis has not had an effect on
standard GST/VAT rates. One of the disadvantages of this regression approach is that
it does not allow us to asses the balance of our covariates after running the regressions.
Therefore, let us turn to the models which use genetic matching (Table 1, Models 3 & 4
as well as Models 7 & 8). After using the matching procedure, the standardised mean
differences of the three covariates do not show signs of substantial imbalance anymore
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985).5 On average, the financial crisis has increased top PIT
rates by 3 percentage points in the short run. In the medium run, the effect remains
statistically significant and even increases to more than 4.3 percentage points. In
comparison, the financial crisis has not had a statistically significant effect on standard
GST/VAT rates.6 The results are similar when we use a weighting approach instead
of matching (Table A2). In total, countries with a crisis have increased progressive
top PIT rates whereas GST/VAT rates have not diverged between crisis and non-crisis
countries. These findings strongly support H1 and H2.
It is important to stress that this difference-in-differences approach looks at the
average treatment effect on the treated. Thus, it does not analyse heterogeneity in
the treatment effect. For instance, it might be the case that fiscal fairness claims for
taxing the rich were weaker in states which were more capable to buffer the shock of
the financial crisis via monetary policy or social expenditure. However, the limited
sample size of my analysis makes the estimation of such subgroup effects difficult
(Hainmueller, Mummolo, & Xu, 2019). Therefore, investigating heterogeneity in the
treatment effect is an interesting approach for future qualitative work.
To get a closer look on the actual mechanisms of this crisis effect, let us now
turn to the panel models. The results are presented in Table 2. Model 1 shows the
results without differentiating whether changes in debt have happened in the wake
of the financial crisis or not. Model 2 adds the financial crisis dummy. Finally, Model
3 includes an interaction effect between changes in public debt and the financial cri-
sis. In line with the previous difference-in-differences models, financial crises have
a positive impact on top PIT rates (Table 2, Model 2). Furthermore, the influence of
higher public debt clearly differs depending on whether debt increases in a post-crisis
year or not. In ‘normal’ times, the effect of higher debt is indistinguishable from zero
(Model 3). Increasing public debt only leads to higher top PIT rates in the wake of
the financial crisis. This finding is also robust to excluding the year fixed effects in
Table 1: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Change in Top PIT Rates and GST/VAT Rates, 2007–2014
∆ Top PIT ∆ GST/VAT
All Observations Genetic Matching All Observations Genetic Matching
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
2007–2010 2007–2014 2007–2010 2007–2014 2007–2010 2007–2014 2007–2010 2007–2014
Financial Crisis 2.6324∗ 3.9848∗ 2.9995∗ 4.3632∗ −0.0031 0.0641 −0.1978 −0.3546
(1.1242) (1.7026) (1.1824) (2.0282) (0.3056) (0.4267) (0.4749) (0.5843)
GDP 2007 (log) 1.0337∗ 1.1103 2.4686∗ 3.1562 −0.1393 −0.1687 −0.5404 −0.7601
(0.4870) (0.7376) (0.9159) (1.5711) (0.1510) (0.2108) (0.3648) (0.4488)
Debt 2007 0.0035 0.0136 0.0177 0.0403 −0.0011 0.0021 0.0020 0.0022
(0.0126) (0.0191) (0.0240) (0.0412) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0099) (0.0122)
Globalisation 2007 −0.1152∗ −0.0995 −0.2599∗∗ −0.2876 0.0339∗ 0.0484∗ 0.0633 0.1006∗
(0.0535) (0.0810) (0.0958) (0.1643) (0.0159) (0.0222) (0.0403) (0.0496)
(Intercept) −3.7186 −4.0764 −6.5917 −11.8924 −0.7475 −1.0749 1.0163 1.1324
(2.4148) (3.6574) (4.9910) (8.5611) (0.7845) (1.0956) (2.1037) (2.5881)
R2 0.0949 0.0799 0.2494 0.1971 0.0830 0.1111 0.0853 0.1323
Observations 122 122 44 44 103 103 43 43
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
order to ensure that the findings are not driven by collinearity of the crises with tem-
poral dynamics (Model 4). Figure 3 illustrates this interaction effect by showing the
conditional effect of changes in public debt on changes in top PIT rates. In countries
without a prior crisis, rising public debt does not increase the predicted change of
top PIT rates. If increases in debt happen in the wake of the financial crisis, however,
predicted tax rate changes are positive and statistically significant. The assumption
of common support holds: for example, there are 172 country-year observations in
which increases in debt were higher than 5% of GDP. On average, a crisis-induced in-
crease in debt by 5% of GDP leads to a predicted rise in top PIT rates by 0.7 percentage
points. Since there are more non-crisis years (853) than crisis-years (123), confidence
intervals are larger for the effect of ∆ Debt with a previous financial crisis.
In sum, higher public debt does not lead to more progressive taxation per se.
Instead, increasing public debt as an effect of state action prior to and during the
financial crisis raises demands for compensatory taxation. To put it in other words, the
causes of dire fiscal times shape tax policy-making. If higher debt takes the form of an
external effect of the financial crisis (e.g., because of public bailouts), tax progressivity
increases to compensate for this process (H3).
Most of the control variables do not have a statistically significant effect on top
PIT rates. The coefficients for the lagged top PIT rates are negative and statistically
significant. This indicates that top PIT rates have converged. Real GDP growth has
a negative and statistically significant coefficient, too. Democratic institutions have a
positive, yet statistically insignificant effect on top tax rates. One might argue that
democratic institutions are a general scope condition for tax policy changes based on
fiscal fairness claims. Since most countries hit by the financial crisis were democratic,
I cannot run interaction effects to further investigate this argument here. However,
Scheve and Stasavage (2012, p. 96) show that compensatory arguments can lead to
higher tax progressivity in both democratic and non-democratic settings.
To check the robustness of my findings, I run several additional model specifi-
cations. First, influential cases might bias the results. To deal with this problem, I
Table 2: Panel Models, 2006–2014
Dependent Variable: ∆ Top PIT Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top PITt−1 -0.0136* -0.0165* -0.0173* -0.0169*
(0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0070)
∆ Debtt−1 0.0116 0.0106 0.0036 0.0056
(0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0067)
Financial Crisist−1 0.7283* 0.2223 0.2338
(0.3336) (0.3541) (0.3390)
∆ Debtt−1 * Financial Crisist−1 0.0981*** 0.0923***
(0.0221) (0.0229)
∆ Unemployment 0.0940 0.0836 0.0599 0.0358
(0.0568) (0.0538) (0.0517) (0.0475)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.0753 0.0647 0.0857 0.1154
(0.1225) (0.1267) (0.1235) (0.1188)
GDP Growth -0.0583* -0.0499* -0.0472* -0.0334
(0.0229) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0211)
Globalisation -0.0062 -0.0106 -0.0114 -0.0122
(0.0126) (0.0121) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Democracy 0.0713 0.0981 0.0921 0.1043
(0.2238) (0.2278) (0.2283) (0.2273)
Population (log) 0.0589 0.0489 0.0592 0.0610
(0.0453) (0.0457) (0.0448) (0.0457)
R2 0.029 0.034 0.042 0.029
Observations 976 976 976 976
Countries 122 122 122 122
Year FE 3 3 3 7
Robust SE 3 3 3 3
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
perform a stepwise exclusion of countries via a jackknife procedure. Second, I use
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) as well as a Prais–Winsten estimation which
models first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) disturbances (Plümper, Troeger, & Manow,
2005). Third, I run a subset analyses only for the 36 OECD countries to ensure that the
results are not driven by the heterogeneous country sample. Since all OECD coun-
tries were democratic throughout the observation period, I cannot estimate the effect
of democratic institutions on tax rate changes. Fourth, I look at the level of the top PIT
rate instead of its first difference. By doing so, the purpose of the lagged dependent
variable changes. Instead of controlling for dynamics of policy convergence, it now
Figure 3: Conditional Effects for the Impact of ∆ Debt on ∆ Top PIT Rate With and
Without a Financial Crisis
−2
0
2
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 T
o
p 
PI
T
Financial Crisis (t−1) 0 1
0
40
80
120
−10 0 10 20
∆ Debt (t − 1)
N
Note: Shaded areas in the upper plot show 95% confidence intervals.
serves as a dynamic specification which controls for autocorrelation (Keele & Kelly,
2006). Finally, I run a model which follows the so-called de facto Beck and Katz (1995)
standard as it includes a lagged dependent variable, country and year fixed effects as
well as PCSEs. Results hold throughout all models (Table A5, Models 1-5). Figure
4 visualises this by showing average marginal effects of changes in debt for all the
different models. Across specification, higher public debt does not lead to increases
in top PIT rates in the absence of a financial crises. To the contrary, crisis-induced
debt has a positive and statistically as well as substantively significant effect on top
rates. Furthermore, I expand my models by including additional covariates (Table A6
in the Online Appendix).7 Again, the main results prove to be robust.
Figure 4: Average Marginal Effects of ∆ Debt With and Without a Financial Crisis
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6 Conclusion
Has the financial crisis led to higher taxes on the rich? Using new data on top PIT
rates for a global country sample, I have shown that the financial crisis has indeed
caused rising tax rates on high incomes. On average, the financial crisis increased top
PIT rates by more than 4 percentage points in the medium run. Furthermore, this
effect does not solely stem from a need for revenues in times of crisis. As my analysis
has shown, we cannot observe a similar crisis-effect for revenue-efficient yet regressive
sales taxes. Thus, rising top PIT rates serve the function of restoring fiscal fairness.
As richer subgroups in the population profited from state actions both directly and
indirectly in crisis countries, higher tax rates on the rich aim at compensating for this
unequal treatment. In line with studies about the effect of warfare on tax progres-
sivity (Scheve & Stasavage, 2016), I have argued that the procedural dimension of
socio-economic outcomes is a crucial factor for policy-making. It is not general fiscal
problem pressure that causes politicians to raise tax rates on the rich. Instead, what
matters is how these problems were caused in the first place. The empirical analysis
has supported this approach: higher debt does not lead to increasing top PIT rates
per se. In fact, higher public debt only increases tax rates on top incomes if it is crisis-
induced. Hence, only if higher debt is perceived as the unfair result of (pre-)crisis
measures, top PIT rates will rise to compensate for this unequal treatment.
The findings of my study have implications for the growing literature on in-
equality and tax policy-making in the 21st century (Kiser & Karceski, 2017; Piketty,
2014). First, I have shown that fiscal fairness considerations to tax the rich (Scheve &
Stasavage, 2016) also work in the absence of mass warfare. In my study, the financial
crisis has served as an example for another different macro-level shock that caused
a revival of progressive taxation. Thus, fiscal fairness claims still play a role for tax
policy-making and the demise of interstate warfare does not necessarily mean the end
of progressive taxation as we know it. Furthermore, these results also provide a new
perspective on the literature of unequal political influence (Bartels, 2008; Gilens &
Page, 2014). Whilst these authors find that policy-makers are more responsive to the
policy preferences of wealthy citizens, my study shows that general fiscal fairness de-
mands to compensate for an unequal treatment can still affect taxes on the rich. Thus,
the results suggest that mass policy preferences can still matter for policy-making
(Canes-Wrone, 2015).
Second, there is still room to manoeuvre for national (tax) states. For a tax like
the PIT which is indirectly under global market pressure (Ganghof, 2006b), national
governments can increase top tax rates. Yet, three things have to be considered here.
First, as the PIT offers more degrees of freedom to tax policy-makers, we might not
expect to see a similar crisis effect for a tax with a more mobile tax base like the cor-
porate income tax. In fact, the Irish case offers anecdotal evidence on this. In the
very same budget speeches where Minister Lenihan justified top PIT rate hikes with
compensatory claims, he spoke out against raising corporate income taxes as it was "a
key aspect of our inward investment strategy" (Lenihan, 2009). Second, multilateral
cooperation against tax evasion in the aftermath of the crisis has changed the scope
conditions of taxing personal income (Hakelberg, 2016). These measures, and most
notably the AEOI, have increased the capability of national governments to adjust
taxation of personal income even further (Hakelberg & Rixen, 2018). Third, the av-
erage crisis effect on top PIT rates is substantial (4 percentage points) when we look
at tax policy-making in the last 30 years. As a comparison, the Social Democratic
Party (SPD) of Germany demanded an increase of the top PIT rate by 3 percentage
points in the 2017/2018 coalition talks with the Christian Democrats (Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 2018).8 However, the size of the crisis effect is relatively small compared to
the effect that previous wars and crises had on tax progressivity over the long run of
history. For instance, Scheve and Stasavage (2010) find that countries which mobilised
for World War I raised top marginal PIT rates by more than 30 percentage points.
Third, the article offers a new perspective on fiscal consolidation in the wake
of the crisis. So far, much work has looked at austerity programmes (Armingeon,
2012; Schäfer & Streeck, 2013). However, my analysis has shown that crisis-induced
compensatory claims can shape fiscal consolidation measures. Whilst this study has
focused on taxation, future research could investigate other dimensions of public
households. Have fiscal fairness considerations affected spending cuts after the Great
Recession? Does progressive taxation differ from other redistributive policies? If yes,
why? Furthermore, has welfare state retrenchment after the financial crisis strength-
ened compensatory demands to tax the rich even further? Such analyses would also
help to shed more light on the connection between tax and social policies. This nexus
between the funding and the spending side of public households has largely been
overlooked in comparative political economy research.
This article has looked at the PIT as a highly visible and contested tax. Exam-
ining the crisis’ effects on other progressive taxes is a crucial next step. For example,
what role have fiscal fairness claims played in the wake of the financial crisis for
extremely progressive taxes on inheritances and net wealth? Did the crisis have an
influence on property and land taxes, which are predominantly levied on the sub-
national level? And what role did fairness arguments play for proposals of a finan-
cial transaction tax? Finding out which factors are driving the development of other
highly redistributive taxes is crucial for our understanding of inequality dynamics
nowadays.
Notes
1The literature differentiates between two types of self-centered inequity aversion: advantageous
and disadvantageous inequality aversion. Whereas at the former, individuals are opposed to inequality
whilst being in a better financial situation than others, the latter creates support for redistributive tax-
ation out of a situation where an individual is doing economically worse than others (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999).
2Setting two out of six criteria as the threshold includes borderline cases.
3Due to missing covariates, Mongolia is the only country with a financial crisis that is not included in
my sample. Cyprus experienced a financial crisis starting in 2011. The difference-in-difference models
are based on calculations excluding Cyprus to keep the country sample stable. However, results hold
when Cyprus is included in the analysis of medium-term change.
4Although my data only starts in 2006, looking at data from Peter et al. (2010) supports the assump-
tion of a parallel trend between the treatment and control group (Figure A1).
5Due to the matching process, the number of observations decreases from 122 to 44 (43 for GST/-
VAT). Table A4 gives an overview on the matched sample.
6The overall number of observation decreases as the KPMG (2017) data has a smaller country range.
However, data is only missing for countries in the control group.
7Namely, I control for the absolute level of public debt (% of GDP), inequality via the GINI in-
dex (both from World Bank, 2018), cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index, range from 1="hegemony
of right-wing (and centre) parties" to 5="hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties", from
Armingeon et al., 2018), and natural resources (oil and gas production per capita (logged), from Ross
& Mahdavi, 2015).
8The SPD’s proposal faced strong objections from employers’ organisations as well as from their
coalition partner which warned that an increase of the top PIT rate would have negative economic
consequences (FAZ, 2018).
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Table A1: Countries in Sample with a Financial Crisis
Country Start Financial Crisis
Austria 2008
Belgium 2008
Cyprus 2011
Denmark 2008
France 2008
Germany 2008
Greece 2008
Hungary 2008
Iceland 2008
Ireland 2008
Italy 2008
Kazakhstan 2008
Latvia 2008
Luxembourg 2008
Netherlands 2008
Nigeria 2009
Portugal 2008
Russia 2008
Slovenia 2008
Spain 2008
Sweden 2008
Switzerland 2008
Ukraine 2008
United Kingdom 2007
United States 2007
Table A2: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Change in Top PIT and VAT Rates
(Results after Weighting), 2007–2014
2007–2010 2007–2014 2007–2010 2007–2014
Financial Crisis 3.0554∗ 3.9912∗ 0.0928 0.1172
(1.2961) (1.9492) (0.3663) (0.5154)
(Intercept) −1.8338 −0.9599 0.4489∗ 1.1870∗∗∗
(1.0349) (1.2343) (0.2075) (0.3290)
AIC 698.0977 796.8369 320.3897 391.2117
Observations 122 122 103 103
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A3: Balance Statistics Before and After Matching
Variable Type Mean Control Mean Treated Stand. Mean Diff. Balance
Before Matching
GDP 2007 (log) Contin. 8.3815 10.2173 1.7213 Unbalanced, >0.25
Debt 2007 Contin 39.0112 43.2500 0.1421 Balanced, <0.25
Globalisation 2007 Contin. 60.0828 81.4742 1.9362 Unbalanced, >0.25
After Matching
GDP 2007 (log) Contin. 10.1487 10.2173 0.0644 Balanced, <0.25
Debt 2007 Contin 40.2250 43.2500 0.1014 Balanced, <0.25
Globalisation 2007 Contin. 79.7079 81.4742 0.1599 Balanced, <0.25
Figure A1: Top PIT Rate 2000–2005 for Countries With and Without a Financial Crisis
20
30
40
50
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
To
p 
PI
T 
Ra
te
FC
No FC
Note: Data from Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010).
Table A4: Matched Country Sample PIT
Country Treatment
1 Austria Treated
2 Belgium Treated
3 Switzerland Treated
4 Germany Treated
5 Denmark Treated
6 Spain Treated
7 France Treated
8 United Kingdom Treated
9 Greece Treated
10 Hungary Treated
11 Ireland Treated
12 Iceland Treated
13 Italy Treated
14 Kazakhstan Treated
15 Luxembourg Treated
16 Latvia Treated
17 Nigeria Treated
18 Netherlands Treated
19 Portugal Treated
20 Russian Federation Treated
21 Slovenia Treated
22 Sweden Treated
23 Ukraine Treated
24 United States Treated
25 Australia Control
26 Azerbaijan Control
27 Botswana Control
28 Canada Control
29 Chile Control
30 Cameroon Control
31 Cyprus Control (Treated)
32 Czech Republic Control
33 Dominican Republic Control
34 Estonia Control
35 Finland Control
36 Israel Control
37 Kuwait Control
38 Malta Control
39 Norway Control
40 New Zealand Control
41 Qatar Control
42 Romania Control
43 Singapore Control
44 Zambia Control
Table A5: Panel Models, 2006–2014 (Robustness Checks)
Dependent Variable: ∆ Top PIT Top PIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Top PITt−1 -0.0173* -0.0370* -0.0309* 0.9827*** 0.5860***
(0.0074) (0.0183) (0.0152) (0.0072) (0.0943)
∆ Debtt−1 0.0036 0.0040 0.0052 0.0036 0.0090
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0275) (0.0062) (0.0060)
Financial Crisist−1 0.2223 0.4827 -0.0047 0.2223 0.1900
(0.3736) (0.3450) (0.4268) (0.3541) (0.3139)
∆ Debtt−1 * Financial Crisist−1 0.0981*** 0.0738* 0.1011** 0.0981*** 0.0841*
(0.0241) (0.0334) (0.0323) (0.0221) (0.0344)
∆ Unemployment 0.0599 0.0640 -0.0231 0.0599 0.0097
(0.0559) (0.0416) (0.1330) (0.0517) (0.0424)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.0857 0.0420 0.8885 0.0857 -1.7797**
(0.1302) (0.1564) (0.4576) (0.1235) (0.5484)
GDP Growth -0.0472 -0.0463 -0.1282 -0.0472* -0.0341
(0.0240) (0.0313) (0.0728) (0.0226) (0.0290)
Globalisation -0.0114 -0.0051 -0.0403 -0.0114 -0.0953
(0.0122) (0.0182) (0.0251) (0.0116) (0.0496)
Democracy 0.0921 0.2512 0.0921 2.3901**
(0.2344) (0.3001) (0.2283) (0.7671)
Population (log) 0.0592 0.1006 0.1790** 0.0592 -2.3211
(0.0466) (0.0521) (0.0573) (0.0448) (2.1249)
R2 0.042 0.041 0.144 0.966 0.977
Observations 976 976 288 976 976
Countries 122 122 36 122 122
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 7 7 7 7 3
Robust SE 3 7 3 3 7
PCSE 7 3 7 7 3
AR(1) 7 3 7 7 7
Jackknife 3 7 7 7 7
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A6: Panel Models, 2006–2014
Dependent Variable: ∆ Top PIT Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top PITt−1 -0.0206* -0.0295 -0.0441** -0.0228***
(0.0081) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0061)
∆ Debtt−1 0.0030 -0.0274 0.0247 -0.0005
(0.0061) (0.0164) (0.0257) (0.0046)
Financial Crisist−1 0.2435 0.2080 0.0751 0.3701
(0.3616) (0.4748) (0.4497) (0.4234)
∆ Debtt−1 * Financial Crisist−1 0.0913*** 0.1257*** 0.0734* 0.0765**
(0.0222) (0.0277) (0.0328) (0.0234)
∆ Unemployment 0.0643 0.1212 -0.1093 0.2903*
(0.0523) (0.1100) (0.1343) (0.1140)
GDP per Capita (log) 0.0909 0.4041 1.1692* 0.3437
(0.1264) (0.2431) (0.4766) (0.1764)
GDP Growth -0.0423 -0.0466 -0.1965* -0.0028
(0.0233) (0.0388) (0.0788) (0.0263)
Globalisation -0.0134 -0.0152 -0.0169 -0.0325*
(0.0118) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0161)
Democracy 0.0997 0.2303 0.5985*
(0.2287) (0.5812) (0.2874)
Population (log) 0.0545 0.0912 0.1208 0.1467**
(0.0460) (0.0761) (0.0672) (0.0485)
Debtt−1 0.0051
(0.0027)
Inequality 0.0389
(0.0212)
Left Cabinet 0.2284*
(0.0985)
Natural Resources (log) -0.0089
(0.0352)
R2 0.045 0.081 0.180 0.068
Observations 976 503 287 619
Countries 122 103 36 82
Year FE 3 3 3 3
Robust SE 3 3 3 3
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
